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Abstract
We introduce the heterogeneity of labor in a simple imperfectly com-
petitive aggregate labor market model ￿￿ la Manning (1990)￿in order to
analyze the e⁄ects of an exogenous rise of the legal minimum wage on
the unemployment equilibrium, the wage dispersion and the general price
level. We assume also the presence of "knowledge spillovers" in the in-
dividual production function leading to increasing returns to scale at the
aggregate level and involving the possibility of multiple equilibria. Then,
thanks to a comparative statics exercise, we show that a rise in the legal
minimum wage has no impact on the unemployment equilibria, increases
the general price level proportionally to the share of low-skilled employ-
ment in the total employment and reduces the wage dispersion. These
results are broadly consistent with the Card Krueger￿ s empirical ￿ndings
(1995).
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1Introduction
The problem of minimum wage hikes has been actively discussed among econo-
mists. The primary goal of such a government￿ s intervention is to improve the
welfare of low paid workers. However, many are those who think that an in-
crease in the minimum wage leads also to employment losses for the workers at
the bottom of the wage distribution as young workers or low-skilled workers.
In their book, Card and Krueger (1995) argue that the data on the fast-food
industry in U.S. states give no support to this idea. Machin and Manning (1994)
analyze also the e⁄ect of the minimum wage cuts on employment in the U.K.
and reach to the same conclusions. With these works, the debate has been
revived as well in the academic area as in the political area.
The e⁄ect of minimum wage on employment has been analyzed especially
with models like the e¢ ciency wage model (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995) or the
monopsony model (Card and Krueger, 1995), i.e. models where the ￿rm has a
high power on wage determination. In the monopsony model, the ￿rm consents
to pay higher wages in order to reduce quit rates and make easier recruitments,
while in the e¢ ciency wage model higher wages intend to resolve the worker
incentive problem. As a result, in such models a minimum wage can have a
positive or null e⁄ect on employment. However, as mentioned by Cahuc et al.
(2001), only few papers rely on models using wage bargaining with trade union;
even though this way of wage determination appears as an important feature of
European labor markets.
Furthermore, the sharp variations in European unemployment rates have
induced economists to explain this fact by the movement from one equilibrium
to another. Thus, the possibility of multiple equilibria in an economy has been
highlighted. In his researches, Manning (1990, 1992) has developed this view
and estimated a model for British data for the period 1951-1987. Theoreti-
cally, the possibility of multiple equilibria comes from the presence of strategic
complementarities between agents. In his book, Cooper (1999) reports and an-
alyzes in detail levels where they can occur: external or internal returns to scale
in production technology, imperfect competition, and the way in which agents
come together to trade (search and matching) and take their decisions (timing
of choices).
According to these reports, the purpose of our paper is to examine the e⁄ects
of minimum wage increase on labor market￿ s performance in a multiple equilibria
model where the wage negotiation takes place between a ￿rm and a trade union.
The model used in the paper is essentially the imperfectly competitive model
of Manning (1990) in which we introduce the heterogeneity of labor and the
presence of knowledge spillovers in the individual production technology.
Considering heterogeneous workers is required when we want to focus the
analysis on the e⁄ects of a minimum wage. Therefore, we consider that the
labor force employed by the ￿rm consists of low-skilled workers who are paid at
the minimum wage and high-skilled workers who are paid at a negotiated wage.
This negotiated wage results from a bilateral bargaining between the ￿rm and
the trade union which is assumed to be not dominated by skilled workers.
2The assumption of knowledge spillovers is a convenient way to produce in-
creasing returns to scale at the aggregate level while having constant returns
to scale at the ￿rm level. In the Manning￿ s model, the possibility of multiple
equilibria is due to the presence of increasing returns to scale at the ￿rm level,
although this assumption has no strong theoretical justi￿cation. However, for
several years, knowledge has been considered as a fundamental source of in-
creasing returns to scale and a determinant of the persistence of productivity
and income di⁄erentials across economic agents of production (Romer, 1986).
Thus, in our model, the presence of knowledge spillovers allows us to give theo-
retical support for the presence of increasing returns to scale. These knowledge
spillovers work through the average level of high-skilled labor employed in the
economy, the high-skilled labor being both the engine and the carrier of knowl-
edge.
The paper is organized as follows. In the ￿rst section, we present the model
(the price behavior of the ￿rm and the wage determination) and the general
symmetric equilibrium. Secondly, we deal with the multiple equilibria existence
issue. In this goal, we highlight the conditions under which this case occurs
and we verify the existence of them. In a third section, we run a comparative
statics analysis and we show that a minimum wage increase has no e⁄ect on
the unemployment equilibria, increases general price level and reduces wage
dispersion. Finally, we compare our theoretical ￿ndings with those of Card and
Krueger (1995).
1 The model
We use the Manning￿ s model (1990) broadly based on the Layard-Nickell￿ s model
(1985, 1986), in which we introduce the heterogeneity of labor and the presence
of knowledge spillovers. In this model, the ￿rms set their price, produce output
and ￿x employment on the basis of the demand for their output and taking the
wages as given. Then, they bargain with trade unions about the level of real
wages.
1.1 The price behavior of the ￿rm and its demand of labor
We assume monopolistic competition on the good market. The economy is made
up of F identical imperfectly competitive ￿rms, each producing an imperfectly




2i with ￿ + ￿ = 1 (1)
where n1i represents its employment of high-skilled labor, n2i its employment
of low-skilled labor and A an e¢ ciency parameter of labor. Since ￿+￿ = 1; we
have constant returns to scale at the ￿rm level. A is assumed to be a function
1As in the paper of Manning (1990), the number of ￿rm is assumed ￿xed and the capital
is excluded for simplicity.
3of the average employment level of high-skilled labor in the economy n1 and to
have the following form:
A = n￿￿
1 (2)
The knowledge spillovers present in the economy in￿ uence the ￿rm￿ s production
e¢ ciency through this parameter A, where n1 = 1
F
PF
i=1 n1i, ￿￿ > 0 represents
the size of these knowledge spillovers and ￿ > 0 is a measure of the degree
of externalities. Indeed, given the fact that knowledge is the cause of new
technologies development and mainly produced and spread by high-skilled labor
force, considering that the production e¢ ciency depends on the average use of
high-skilled labor in an economy is a relevant assumption. Thus, the more the
economy employs high-skilled labor, the more the labor employed by one ￿rm
and so its production is e¢ cient. However, the ￿rm is assumed to be too small
to have any in￿ uence on the aggregate state of the economy, and so the ￿rm
i takes this parameter A as given during its optimization program. Thus, the
positive externality of high-skilled employment is not internalised by the ￿rm
and it takes an advantage of high-skilled employment decisions of all other ￿rms
without having to pay for it.
Consequently, on account of the monopolistic competition and the presence
of knowledge spillovers, we have two sources of strategic complementarities in
this economy. Indeed, the production decision of each ￿rm has a positive e⁄ect
on the other ￿rms￿production level, through the aggregate demand channel, as
well as on the other ￿rms￿production e¢ ciency, through the knowledge spillovers
channel. These strategic complementarities make possible the existence of mul-
tiple equilibria.
The total employment of ￿rm i writes:
ni = n1i + n2i (3)
Let ￿i = n2i=ni 2 ]0;1[ the proportion of low-skilled labor employment in the
total employment for the ￿rm i and ￿i = w=w1i 2 ]0;1[ a measure of the wage
dispersion between the high-skilled and low-skilled labor where w represents the
minimum wage which is earned by low-skilled workers and w1i the wage of high-
skilled workers which is negotiated. The lower ￿i is, the larger the gap between
the low-skilled worker￿ s wage and high-skilled worker￿ s wage is. Consequently,
the total wage cost of the ￿rm i can be written as a function of the high-skilled
worker￿ s wage w1i, the total labor demand and the two parameters de￿ned
above:
wini = w1in1i + wn2i = [1 + (￿i ￿ 1)￿i]w1ini = C(￿i;￿i)w1ini (4)
with C(￿i;￿i) 2 ]0;1[ and where wi = C(￿i;￿i)w1i represents a wage index paid
by the ￿rm to its workers. We can also write the production technology of the
￿rm i as a function of ni and ￿i:
yi = B(￿i)ni where B(￿i) = A(1 ￿ ￿i)￿￿
￿
i (5)
4The demand for the ￿rm i￿ s output is assumed to be given by:
yd
i = (Y=F)(pi=P)
￿s ; s > 1 (6)
where Y is the total aggregate demand, pi the ￿rm i￿ s price, P the general price
level and s the demand elasticity in the good produced by the ￿rm i2.
The real pro￿t of the ￿rm i can be written as:
￿i=P = (pi=P)yi ￿ C(￿i;￿i)(w1i=P)ni (7)
Each ￿rm i chooses pi in order to maximize its real pro￿t. When optimizing, the
￿rm takes the aggregate state of the economy and the real wage of high-skilled
workers as given, and produces exactly the amount addressed to it. Thus, it
solves the following program:
(pi=P)
￿ = arg max ￿i=P





















This equation shows that the price ￿xed by the ￿rm is an increasing function of
labor cost. Then, we use the equations (5), (6) and (8) to obtain an employment















The total labor demand of the ￿rm has the common features found in the litera-
ture, i.e. it is downward sloping in the high-skilled real wage-employment space,
decreasing in the labor cost3 and increasing in the total aggregate demand.
1.2 The wage determination at the ￿rm level
The bargaining is decentralized and rests on the wage only, so we assume a
"right-to-manage" model. The low-skilled labor wage corresponds to the legal
minimum wage. It is ￿xed by law and not negotiated between the ￿rm and the
trade union. The bargaining concerns just the high-skilled labor wage w1i.
2This speci￿cation of the demand function is derived from CES speci￿cation of preferences












5The trade union hasn￿ t insider behavior and is not dominated by high-skilled
workers. It cares about the welfare of both high-skilled and low-skilled employ-
ees for which the wage is ￿xed exogenously.We assume further that it weights
equally the welfare of all employees of the ￿rm and considers it as a whole dur-
ing the negotiation. We assume also that it gives as much importance to the


















where wR is the real reservation wage which is exogenous at the ￿rm level.
This reservation wage represents the alternative utility of workers when the
bargaining leads to none agreement between the ￿rm and the trade union. Its
speci￿cation will be given later. The ￿rm￿ s utility is represented by its real
pro￿ts.














s:t ni = n￿
i
wR given
Where ￿ 2 ]0;1[ represents the bargaining power of the union. The ￿rst













+ 1 ￿ 1 (11)
Where ￿(￿;s) is the mark-up. This wage equation is traditional and says that
the high-skilled real wage is marked-up over the reservation wage with a mark-
up which is greater than one and increasing in the bargaining power of union.
Now, we turn to the general equilibrium of this economy.
1.3 The general equilibrium
At the general symmetric equilibrium, all the ￿rms and trade unions are iden-
tical and take the same decisions. Thus, we have these following equalities:
pi = P;w1i = w1;n1i = n1;n2i = n2;ni = n;yi = y = Y=F;￿i = ￿ and ￿i = ￿
Furthermore, given the fact that all agents have taken their decisions at this
step, we consider that the share of low-skilled labor in total employment ￿ and
the aggregate wage dispersion ￿ are constant in what follows.
Since the number of ￿rms in the economy is assumed ￿xed, the aggregate
production can be deduced from the sum of the F identical individual production
technologies:
4Here, the union￿ s preferences correspond to the utilitarian model of Oswald (1982).
6Y = Fy = F(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1+￿)￿￿n(1+￿￿) (12)
At the aggregate level, we have increasing returns to scale (IRS) of labor due to
the presence of knowledge spillovers in the economy and we note that the extent
of these IRS depends on the knowledge spillovers size. Furthermore, these IRS
are completely external to the ￿rm5 but internal to the economy. They corre-
spond to social increasing returns. Thus, the assumption of knowledge spillovers
allows us to have IRS at the aggregate level while having constant returns to
scale at the ￿rm level and ,in this way, reinforce the strategic complementarities
already introduced by monopolistic competition.
Given the de￿nition of the unemployment rate u = 1 ￿ (Fn=N), where N
represents the total labor force in the economy, we insert (12) in (9) and we
obtain the aggregate price equation (PS for price setting) which relates the















In order to determine the aggregate wage equation, we need to model the
reservation wage which was exogenous at the ￿rm level. Like Manning (1990),
we use this convenient speci￿cation :
wR = u(B=P) + (1 ￿ u)(w=P) (14)
= u(B=P) + (1 ￿ u)C(￿;￿)(w1=P)
Where u is the unemployment rate and B=P the real unemployment bene￿ts
and w=P the real wage index paid by the ￿rms to the workers. The unemploy-
ment bene￿ts are assumed to be the same for all the workers whatever their
skill level and lower than the minimum wage. Thus, the reservation wage is a
weighted average according to the unemployment rate of the workers￿earnings
from employment and unemployment. We introduce (14) in (11) and we ob-
tain the following aggregate wage equation (WS for wage setting) which relates
also the real high-skilled labor wage to the unemployment rate and exogenous







[1 ￿ ￿(￿;s)(1 ￿ u)]C(￿;￿)
(15)








5The ￿rm is assumed to take the decision of other ￿rms as given and to have no in￿uence
on aggregate state of the economy.
7implies an inferior bound to the de￿nition interval of the unemployment rate.
We see that the larger the mark-up on the reservation wage, the higher this
inferior bound of the unemployment rate is. This lower bound represents the
unemployment trap of this economy, i.e. the minimum unemployment rate that
the economy can achieve given the bargaining power of trade unions on the
labor market and the competition on the good market. Indeed, if the ￿rm
sets the wage by itself (￿ = 0) and if there is perfect competition on the good
market (s ! 1), the mark-up on the reservation will be equal to one and this
unemployment trap will be null.
2 Multiple equilibria
In order to deal with the existence of multiple equilibria in this economy, we ￿rst
analyze some properties of the aggregate equations. Next, we verify the exis-
tence of multiple unemployment equilibria and characterize them. To conclude,
we discuss the case of non-existence of equilibrium.
2.1 Equations￿properties
For both equilibrium equations we compute the ￿rst and second order deriv-
atives to determine their shape, and theirs limits towards the bounds of the
unemployment rate￿ s de￿nition interval.
2.1.1 The aggregate price equation
































whatever the size of the knowledge spillovers in the economy. The PS curve is
concave (linear) in the space (u,
w1
P
) when ￿￿ 2 ]0;1[ (￿￿ = 1), and convex
when ￿￿ > 1.
Proof. We verify that the expression (16) is always negative when ￿￿ > 0;
and the expression (17) is negative (null, positive) when ￿￿ 2 ]0;1[ (￿￿ = 1;
￿￿ > 1).
To give an economic interpretation of this proposition we need to understand
the consequences of knowledge spillovers, and so of social returns to scale they
8involve. When a ￿rm increases its production, it increases its employment level
and, as a result, its high-skilled employment level. This involves a rise in the
aggregate production and aggregate income which lead to an increase in the
aggregate demand. Consequently, the other ￿rms are incited to increase their
own output (demand externality coming from monopolistic competition) and in
their turn to increase their own high-skilled employment level. Finally, these
rises in high-skilled employment level make greater the e¢ ciency of labor used
by each ￿rm (knowledge spillovers e⁄ect). With a labor more e¢ cient, the ￿rms
produce more output with a given employment level what implies a decreasing
marginal cost. Thus, the ￿rms set lower prices when the e¢ ciency of labor is
increased leading to a lower general price level and higher high-skilled real wage






























These results remain true whatever the size of knowledge spillovers in the
economy. The ￿rst limit can be interpreted as the maximum real wage that the
￿rms consent to pay in the case where the economy achieves its unemployment
trap. For the second one, it￿ s clear that if all workers are unemployed, there will
be no production process and so the ￿rms will pay a null wage.
2.1.2 The aggregate wage equation

























Proposition 2 When ￿(￿;s)>1 and u 2 ]u;1[, the WS curve is always down-
ward sloping and convex in the space (u,
w1
P
) whatever the size of the knowledge
spillovers in the economy.
Proof. We verify that the expression (18) is always negative and the expression
(19) is always positive when ￿(￿;s)>1 and u 2 ]u;1[:
Having no in￿ uence from knowledge spillovers, the economic interpretation is
more usual here. When the unemployment rate increases, the trade union loses
6u and 1￿ represent the extrem values of the de￿nition interval of u 2 ]u;1[.
9pressure power on the bargaining. Indeed, given the lack of outside options, its
bargaining power is lower what involves a lower high-skilled real wage.

















The ￿rst limit highlights the vertical asymptote that the WS curve exhibits.
The second one represents the utility that each high-skilled worker can expect
to have in the case of no employment.
2.2 Multiple unemployment equilibria
According to the previous properties of the curves, we can state the following
proposition about the equilibria existence.
Proposition 3 When ￿￿ 2 ]0;1], there are two distinct unemployment equilib-
ria which belong to u 2 ]u;1[:










, both equilibria correspond to the
roots of this expression. We demonstrate easily that the expression ￿(u) is
concave on the interval u 2 ]u;1[ when ￿￿ 2 ]0;1]. It reaches its maximum
above the abscissa axis and it cuts this axis twice in the interval u 2 ]u;1[ (for
more detailed calculations see annex A).
Next, according to the limits of the expressions (13) and (15), we conclude
that:










: the PS curve is below the WS curve.










: the PS curve is below the WS curve.
As a result, we can illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria in this way:
10u 1
) , (








We characterize the two equilibria as follow: one named the "low equilib-








and another named the "high equilibrium" with a low unemployment rate and









Although a welfare analysis is not executed, we can deduce that the equilibria
are pareto ranked with the high equilibrium superior to the low equilibrium.
Indeed, in the ￿rst one the activity level as well as the real wage is greater
than in the second one what implies a higher aggregate demand, production
and income, and so a higher welfare of the economy.
2.3 Non-existence of equilibrium
The proposition 3 tells us that it exists two equilibria if and only if ￿￿ 2 ]0;1];
i.e. if the size of knowledge spillovers is not too large, more speci￿cally if the
returns to scale at the aggregate level are not above 2. Indeed, in the reverse
case ( ￿￿ > 1), there is no intersection between the curves and so no equilibrium
exists.
As in the Manning￿ s paper (1990), the absence of equilibirum can be ex-
plained by the presence of a hysteresis e⁄ect in the unemployment rate. In this
case, the unemployment rate follows a random walk and there is no natural
rate of unemployment in the economy. Then, the unemployment rate depends
mainly on its previous values.
113 E⁄ects of an exogenous increase in the mini-
mum wage
In this section, we analyze the e⁄ects of an exogenous increase in the minimum
wage on the unemployment equilibrium and the high-skilled real wage thanks to
a comparative statics exercise. Then, we ￿nd that a policy raising the minimum
wage has no e⁄ect on unemployment equilibria and reduces the purchasing power
of the high-skilled workers. Finally, we compare these ￿ndings with those of
Card and Krueger (1995) and ￿nd some similarities.
3.1 Comparative statics analysis
A policy that implements a rise in the nominal minimum wage is expressed in
the model by an increase in the parameter ￿:
Proposition 4 An increase in the nominal minimum wage has no e⁄ect on the
unemployment equilibria. Conversely, it involves a decrease in the high-skilled
real wage equilibrium that is larger when the economy is at the high equilibrium
than when it is at the low equilibrium.
We demonstrate using the Cramer￿ s rule on the equilibrium system composed





















(See the annex B for details).
To give an intuition to these results, we may say things in this way. On the
one hand, following an increase in the minimum wage, the ￿rms respond to this
rise in production cost by a rise in its own prices. Indeed, the partial derivative
of (8) according to ￿i shows us that the ￿rm raises its price proportionally about
its share of low-skilled employment ￿i
7. As a consequence, this individual price
increase leads to a higher general price level at the general symmetric equilib-
rium. On the other hand, given the behavior of the trade union, the latter
consents to a decrease in the real wage of workers who don￿ t take advantage of
this nominal wage rise in order to keep the employment level unchanged. As a
result, the bargaining leads to a lower high-skilled real wage. In this way, at the
general equilibrium, the total demand of labor as well as the unemployment rate
remains unchanged whereas the high-skilled real wage decreases. Furthermore,
at the high equilibrium, the employment level is higher than at the low equilib-
rium (since the unemployment is lower), so we can deduce that the low-skilled
employment level is also higher at the high equilibrium than at the low one.
That￿ s why the high-skilled real wage decrease is greater at the high than at the
low equilibirum.
The e⁄ect on the general price level can also be deduced by considering
the shift of the two curves. The partial derivatives of the PS and WS curves
according to the parameter ￿ give us:























































at the equilibrium , both curves move in the same
extent and in the same direction. These shifts are the result of an increase in the
general price level. The expressions (20) and (21) show also that the variation
of the general price level is increasing in ￿, i.e. the proportion of low-skilled
labor employment in the total employment. Thus, we can conclude that the
increase in the general price level is large enough to cover the new production
cost and that an economic policy increasing the minimum wage involves mainly
a cost push in￿ ation in the economy.
An other interesting feature of these results is the fact that the implications
of this economic policy on unemployment are the same whatever the equilib-
rium of the economy. Indeed, we have the same comparative statics results at
the low and high equilibrium except for the extent of the high-skilled real wage
decrease. The equilibrium selection is usually requested in the case where the
comparative statics results are reverse to one equilibrium from another to imple-
ment an appropriate policy, as in Manning (1990). Consequently, the selection
equilibrium analysis is not approached here since an increase in minimum wage
will always imply a null e⁄ect on unemployment and a cost push in￿ ation.
3.2 Comparisons with Card and Krueger￿ s ￿ndings
Card and Krueger (1995) analyze the e⁄ects of such a policy by comparing the
labor market performances of the 50 US states8 before and after the 1990 and
1991 increases in the federal minimum wage.
They identify di⁄erent employment outcomes on the concerned group of
workers a⁄ected by this rise in the minimum wage in di⁄erent time periods
and regions of the country. There is compelling evidence that the estimated
employment e⁄ects aren￿ t signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. These rises have no
negative employment e⁄ect and even sometimes a positive employment e⁄ect on
the concerned group of workers (Card and Krueger, 1995, pp-389). According
this evidence, the rise in the minimum wage doesn￿ t imply a necessary rise on
unemployment as most models suggest it.
They also analyze the e⁄ects of a higher minimum wage on prices in the fast-
food restaurants industry which is the leading employer of low-wage workers.
Their results show that "the price increases of about the magnitude required to
cover the higher cost of labor associated with the rise in the minimum wage"
(Card and Krueger, 1995, pp-390).
8They divide the states into three groups: two where the wages are high and this increase
has little or no e⁄ect and one where the wages are low and this increase has important e⁄ect.
13Another set of their empirical results is about the e⁄ect of a higher minimum
wage on the distribution of hourly wages. They ￿nd that "these increases in the
federal minimum wage led to signi￿cant increases in wages for workers at the
bottom of the wage distribution, and to a reduction in overall wage dispersion"
(Card and Krueger, 1995, pp-391).
Our model￿ s results strongly support the two ￿rst Card and Krueger￿ s results.
As for the e⁄ect of a higher minimum wage on the distribution of hourly wages,
the similarities with our model are more intuitive. Indeed, we cannot clearly
show that the rise in minimum wage increases the wage of workers at the bottom
of wage distribution due to the discrete types of labor assumption. Nevertheless,
our model allows us to conclude that such a policy leads to a reduction in wage
dispersion since the real wage of high-skilled labor decreases and the real wage
of low-skilled labor increases or remains unchanged9.
The most important discrepancy between these empirical evidences and the
common theory concerns the e⁄ect of a higher minimum wage on employment.
Therefore, Card and Krueger (1995) attempt to give a theoretical explanation
of their ￿ndings by considering alternative models of labor market from the
"textbook" model. They consider models where the wage is either taken by
the ￿rm (variants of the "textbook" model) or set by the ￿rm (monopsony
model10), but never models where the wage of workers paid above the minimum
wage results from a bargaining between the ￿rm and a trade union. Machin
and Manning (1994), who examine the impacts of a decline in the toughness of
minimum wage system on UK￿ s employment, ￿nd similar empirical evidences
and attempt also to explain theoretically these e⁄ects by a monopsony model.
Dickens and al. (1999) present a general theoretical model whereby employers
have some degree of monopsony and in which minimum wage increases can have
positive, neutral or negative e⁄ects on employment according to this degree.
Thus, our model can be also considered as an additional theoretical explanation
of the e⁄ects of minimum wage.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an imperfectly competitive model in which
multiple unemployment equilibria can occur when the returns to scale of labor
are constant at the ￿rm level and increasing at the aggregate level due to the
presence of knowledge spillovers in the economy. Then, we have shown that a
minimum wage increase raises the general price level as a result of cost push
in￿ ation, decreases the real wage of workers who earn more than the minimum
wage, and so reduces the real wage dispersion in the economy. Last but not
least, we demonstrate that this economic policy has no e⁄ect on unemploy-
9The e⁄ect of price increase on real minimum wage depends on the extent of this increase,
but in all case it cannot be superior to the extent of nominal minimum wage increase.
10Machin and Manning (1994): "A monopsonistic labor market is one in which an employer
possesses some market power in setting wages, so that the supply of labor to the ￿rm is a
positive function of the wage paid."
14ment equilibria. Since these results come out irrespective to the nature of the
equilibrium, we don￿ t care about the selection problem in this paper.
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de￿ned on u 2 ]u;1[, with ￿(u) 2 C2: Then,
we must show that ￿(u) admits two distinct positive roots in the interval u when
￿￿ 2 ]0;1] i.e. that ￿(u) cuts twice the abscissa axis in the interval of u 2 ]u;1[

























Now, we just verify that a part of the graph of the function ￿(u) is above
the abscissa axis in the interval of u 2 ]u;1[ when ￿￿ 2 ]0;1]; so we show that
its maximum is positive and belongs to the interval of u 2 ]u;1[:
























is null. This polynom has one positive root e u =





with ￿ = (￿￿ ￿ 1)2 [￿(￿;s) ￿ 1]
2 + 4￿￿￿(￿;s)[￿(￿;s) ￿ 1] > 0; which belongs
to the interval u 2 ]u;1[: In addition, we have ￿(e u) > 0 when ￿￿ 2 ]0;1] and
￿(￿;s) > 1: Thus, ￿(u) admits two distinct positive roots in the interval u when
￿￿ 2 ]0;1] and ￿(￿;s) > 1 QED.













































































































At the equilibrium uH; we have ￿(uH;￿) = ￿(uH;￿), so
duH
d￿
= 0 QED: The
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